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I.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court has original jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to

Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)0") and Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. The
Utah Supreme Court has transferred the case to the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4) and its Order dated February 9, 2004. [Order, R. 840.]
II.

ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW.
A.

Did the district court correctly construe the 19 51 Indenture as conveying

an easement for the uses specified in the Indenture rather than fee title to the surface of the
subject property?
The district court's construction of the Indenture is a question of law that is
reviewed for correctness. See, e.g., Ault v. Holden, 2002 UT 33,ffl[15,37, 44 P.3d 781
(reviewing grant of summary judgment regarding boundary dispute and construction of deed
for correctness); Hartman v. Potter, 596 P.2d 653,656 (Utah 1979) (reviewing construction
of deed for correctness).
B.

Did Missouri Flat fail to preserve its claims of adverse possession,

laches, and estoppel for appellate review where these claims were abandoned at oral
argument, not addressed in the district court's Decision, and not raised by Missouri Flat in
response to the proposed Order?

The determination that a party failed to preserve an issue for appellate review
is a decision made for the first time by the appellate court and therefore not subject to any
particular standard of review. Notwithstanding, the appellate court should defer in some
measure to the trial court in determining from the record whether an issue was raised before
the trial court in a timely fashion or raised to a sufficient level of consciousness. See, e.g.,
State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935-36 (Utah 1994) (explaining need to defer to trial court and
review for clear error in circumstances where the trial court is "in the [better] position to .
. . derive a sense of the proceeding as a whole, something an appellate court cannot hope to
garner from a cold record").
C.

If the issue of adverse possession was adequately preserved, can

Missouri Flat establish title to the surface by adverse possession and demonstrate hostile and
adverse possession if the Indenture conveyed an easement for Missouri Flat to use the land?
Because a determination of ownership by adverse possession requires both
findings of fact and conclusions of law, this issue presents a mixed question. See, e.g.,
State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935-38 (Utah 1994) (discussing mixed questions); Utah Code
Ann. §§ 78-12-7 to -12.1 (2004) (outlining elements of adverse possession). In general, the
district court's legal conclusions are reviewed for correctness, and the findings of fact are
reversed only if they are clearly erroneous. See, e.g., Drazich v. Lasson, 964 P.2d 324, 326
2

(Utah Ct. App. 1998) (noting legal issues are reviewed for correctness and factual issues for
clear error in case involving interpretation of indenture and claims of adverse possession).
However, when confronted with a mixed question of fact and law, appellate courts afford
some measure of discretion to the trial court's application of law to the facts. See Pena, 869
P.2d at 937-38.
D.

If the issues of laches and estoppel were adequately preserved, can

Missouri Flat demonstrate laches or estoppel?
The equitable doctrines of laches and estoppel also present mixed questions.
See, e.g.,Dept. ofHuman Services ex rel Parker v. Irizarry, 945 P.2d 676, 678 (Utah 1997)
("[W]hether equitable estoppel has been proven is a classic mixed question of fact and law");
Angelos v. First Interstate Bank of Utah, 671 P.2d 772, (Utahl983) (noting "considerable
deference" given to trial court on mixed question of laches). When confronted with a mixed
question, appellate courts afford some measure of discretion to the trial court's application
of law to the facts. See Pena, 869 P.2d at 937-38.
III.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES, OR RULES.
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, or

regulations whose interpretation is determinative of the appeal or of central importance to
the appeal.
3

IV.

STATEMENT OF CASE.
A.

Nature of Case and Course of Proceedings.
Gold Mountain filed this case to quiet title to the subject property (the

"Property") located mostly in Piute County, Utah. The action included a number of parties
and title issues. [Complaint, R. 1-65.] Summary judgment was granted or the action was
dismissed as to all parties except Missouri Flat. [Notice of Dismissal, R. 308-09, Order
Granting Summary Judgment, R. 412-20.] Gold Mountain asserted Missouri Flat's interest
in the Property was limited to an easement for the purposes described in the 1951 Indenture
(the "Indenture") from Gold Mountain's predecessor in interest to Missouri Flat's
predecessor in interest. [Complaint, R. 1-65.] {See Addendum, Exhibit 1.)
Gold Mountain filed a motion for summary judgment on its claims regarding
Missouri Flat's interest in the Property with supporting affidavits and a memorandum.
[Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, R. 333-35, Memorandum in Support, R. 322-32,
Affidavit of Russell Reiserer, R. 336-39, Supplemental Affidavit of Russell Reiserer, R. 34042.] Missouri Flat filed a Memorandum in response to the original motion for summary
judgment [R. 343-64] and a Rule 56(f) motion to continue discovery. [Motion to Continue
Discovery, R. 397-98.] A hearing was held on those motions and the district court granted

4

the Rule 56(f) Motion but did not rule on the motion for summary judgment. [Order
Granting Rule 56(f) Motion, R. 442-44.]
After the additional discovery, Missouri Flat amended its Answer and
Counterclaim to allege adverse possession, laches, and estoppel. [First Amended Answer
and Counterclaim, R. 447-57.] Supplemental memoranda were filed by both parties on the
original motion for summary judgment. [Supplementary Memorandum, R. 472-86 and Reply
to Supplementary Memorandum, R. 645-58.] Gold Mountain subsequently filed a separate
motion for summary judgment on Missouri Flat's claims of adverse possession, laches and
estoppel with supporting memorandum and affidavit.

[Motion for Partial Summary

Judgment (Adverse Possession, Laches and Estoppel), R. 638-40, Memorandum in Support
of Second MSJ, R. 603-37, Affidavit of Russell Reiserer, R. 641-44.] A Memorandum in
Opposition to the Second Motion was filed by Missouri Flat [R. 659-77] and a Reply
Memorandum was filed by Gold Mountain. [R. 778-89.]
A review hearing was held on the motions for summary judgment in the district
court in February 2003. [Notice of Review Hearing, R. 796-97.] A telephonic hearing was
held on April 16,2003. [Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings, R. 843, T. 1-27.] During the
telephonic hearing the district court asked for an explanation of the issues to be addressed.
[T. 20-24.] The arguments of both parties focused on the Indenture and the parties agreed
5

that the court should construe the Indenture solely from the language within the four corners
of the Indenture, that they were not claiming that the Indenture was ambiguous, and that
extrinsic evidence should not be used to determine the intent of the parties. [T. 4-21.]
Missouri Flat did not state that any other issues remained to be resolved including adverse
possession, laches and estoppel, even though the court asked if anything else needed to be
discussed. [T. 20-24.]
The Court issued a Decision on Motions for Summary Judgment. [Decision
on Motions for Summary Judgment (the "Decision"), R. 804-08.]

{See Addendum,

Exhibit 2.) In its Decision the district court ruled that Missouri Flat owned a permanent
easement on the surface of the Property for grazing and agricultural purposes subject to Gold
Mountain's right to use the surface and sub-surface for mining purposes and that Missouri
Flat owned the frame house and the surface which it covers in fee simple. The court ruled
that Gold Mountain owned all other rights in the Property. The Decision did not address the
issues of adverse possession, laches, or estoppel. [R. 804-08.]
Counsel for Gold Mountain prepared the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law
and Order and Decree (the "Order") as directed by the Court in the Decision. Because
Missouri Flat had not pursued the issues of adverse possession, laches or estoppel, the Order
provided that Missouri Flat had not established those claims. [Order, fflf 3 , 1 1 , R. 820-22.]
6

The Order was submitted to Missouri Flat's attorney for review, who requested some
revisions but did not object to the proposed disposition of adverse possession, laches, and
estoppel. The Order was entered by the district court. [Order, R. 818-30.] (See Addendum,
Exhibit 3.)
B.

Factual Background.
Before the Indenture, Gold Mountain's predecessor-in-interest owned all right,

title, and interests in the Property that historically had been used for gold mining operations.
[Order, R. 819-20; Reply Memorandum, R. 779-83.] Since the Indenture, Missouri Flat and
its predecessors-in-interest have only used the Property for grazing sheep and/or cattle and
uses directly related to those purposes. [Order, R. 819-20; Reply Memorandum, R. 781.]
Missouri Flat's predecessors used their interest in the Property, along with other land and
interests associated with a large ranching operation, as security for various loans. [Order, R.
819-20; Reply Memorandum, R. 781.] Missouri Flat acquired its interest in the Property by
a July 19,1994 Trustee's Deed resulting from foreclosure by First Security Bank of Utah of
a 1987 Trust Deed from prior owners. [Trustee's Deed, R. 672-704.] Missouri Flat also
obtained a Quitclaim Deed from First Security Bank dated July 20,1994. [Quitclaim Deed,
R. 705-738.]
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Missouri Flat and its predecessors claim to have paid some taxes on the surface
of the Property. [Aplt's Br. p. 3.] Since 1976, however, Gold Mountain and its predecessors
have paid property taxes that were assessed upon the Property as mineral properties.
[Reiserer Aff.^f 8, R. 641-44.] Missouri Flat and its predecessors have not taken any action
or given any indication to Gold Mountain or its predecessors that they claimed any interest
in the Property other than the grazing and agricultural rights granted by the Indenture.
[Reiserer Aff., fflf 5-6; R. 641-44.]
Gold Mountain and its predecessors and their agents have conducted mineral
exploration and development activities on the Property, have built and maintained several
buildings and other improvements on the Property, and have occupied and used the Property
for mining, camping, and recreational activities. [Reiserer Aff. fflf 2-4; R. 641-44.]
V.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS.
A.

The Indenture Conveyed an Easement for the Specified Purposes.
The Indenture grants and conveys the surface of the Property for grazing and

agricultural purposes. Utah case law and other authorities hold that such a conveyance for
specified uses grants an easement for those uses. Construing the Indenture as granting an
easement is necessary to give meaning and purpose to all of the language of the Indenture.
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The Utah case law supporting Gold Mountain's interpretation of the Indenture is controlling
and case law cited by Missouri Flat does not support its interpretation of the Indenture.
B.

The Case Law Appellant Cites from Other States Conflicts with
Utah Case Law.
The Court should rely on Utah case law instead of the conflicting case law

from other states espoused by Missouri Flat. The contrary case law from other states does
not clearly represent the majority rule.
C.

The Rules of Construction Relied Upon by Missouri Flat do not Support its
Interpretation.
Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-3 and the cases based thereon do not support Missouri

Flat's interpretation of the Indenture. Rules of construction based on ambiguity are inappropriate
in light of representations made by Missouri Flat to the district court that the Indenture is
unambiguous.
D.

Missouri Flat Failed to Preserve Claims of Adverse Possession. Laches,
and Estoppel for Appellate Review.
Missouri Flat failed to give the court an opportunity to rule on the issues of

laches, estoppel, and adverse possession because it did not sufficiently raise those issues to
the consciousness of the court and because Missouri Flat did not object to the disposition of
those claims in the final order.

9

E.

Missouri Flat Cannot Prevail on its Claim of Adverse Possession.
Assuming the issue was adequately preserved, Missouri Flat cannot prevail on

its claim that it has established title to the remaining interests in the surface by adverse
possession. No possession has been asserted beyond the use of the surface for grazing and
agricultural purposes, as the Indenture granted, and Missouri Flat and its predecessors have
done nothing to give notice that they claimed an interest adverse to Gold Mountain and its
predecessors.
F.

Missouri Flat Cannot Prevail on its Claims of Laches and Estoppel.
Assuming the issues were adequately preserved, Missouri Flat cannot prevail

on its claims of laches and estoppel because there has been no lack of diligence in bringing
this action, no action or lack thereof that Missouri could have reasonably relied on to its
detriment, and the claim of prejudice cannot be supported.
VI.

ARGUMENT
A.

UNDER UTAH LAW THE INDENTURE CONVEYED AN EASEMENT
FOR THE USES SPECIFIED.
This case involves the construction of the Indenture from Annie Laurie

Consolidated Gold Mines ("First Party") to Franklin Taft Paxton, Claine Tad Paxton,
Genevieve P. Rawson and Geraldine Paxton ("Second Parties") dated April 26, 1951 and

10

recorded July 20, 1951 at Book J of Mining, Page 615 of the Records of Piute County
Recorder's Office (the "Indenture"). (Order, f 5, R. 818-30; Addendum, Ex. 1.) Gold
Mountain is the successor-in-interest to the rights retained in the Indenture by First Party and
Missouri Flat is the successor-in-interest to the interests conveyed to Second Parties by the
Indenture. (Addendum, Ex. 3.)
Gold Mountain agrees with the rules of construction to be applied by the Utah
courts as set out in the Appellant's Brief. Those rules of construction provide that deeds are
construed according to the ordinary rules of contract construction; that the paramount rule
of construction is to give effect to the intent of the parties as expressed in the deed as whole
and from the language of the deed; and that in interpreting the language of a deed no portion
should be rendered meaningless. (Aplt's Br., pp. 5-6.) The Utah Supreme Court has held
that "the main object in construing a deed is to ascertain the intention of the parties,
especially that of the grantor, from the language used" in the deed and the term intention "is
a term of art and signifies the meaning of the writing" Hartman v. Potter, 596 P.2d 653,656
(Utah 1979) (italics in original). The Utah Supreme Court has also stated that if the intent
of the parties can be ascertained, "arbitrary rules of law are not to be invoked, and will not
control the construction of the instrument." Haynes v. Hunt, 85 P.2d 861, 863 (Utah 1939)
(quoting Kirwin v. Farr, 17 Utah 1, 53 P. 608, 609 (1898)).
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While the parties agree upon the rules of construction, they do not agree upon
the interpretation of the Indenture. Missouri Flat contends the Indenture conveyed to Second
Parties full fee title to the surface of the Property. Gold Mountain asserts that because the
Indenture conveyed the surface for grazing and agricultural purposes and granted a separate
right to cut and remove certain species of trees from the surface, the Indenture granted an
easement to Second Parties for the stated uses under Utah law.
The Indenture states in relevant part, as follows:
That First Party, expressly subject to the exceptions and reservations in
favor of First Party its successors and assigns hereinafter mentioned
and set forth and, for and in consideration of the sum of One Thousand
Dollars ($ 1,000.00) and other good and valuable consideration paid by
Second Parties, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, hereby
grants, bargains, sells and conveys unto Second Parties for grazing
and agricultural purposes, the surface of the following described
Patented Lode Mining Claims in Gold Mountain Mining District,
and the surface only of the Other Property described below, with
the right to cut and remove from the surface of said Patented Lode
Mining Claims and Other Property any or all of the quaking aspen
and chaparral thereon, all of said mining claims and property being
situated in Piute and Sevier Counties, State of Utah, to-wit:
Patented Lode Mining Claims:
[descriptions omitted]
Together with the one story frame house located in Upper
Kimberly at the fork of the road leading to Sevier and Marysvale,
Utah.
Other Property:
[descriptions omitted]
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And for the consideration aforesaid First Party hereby conveys and
quit claims unto Second Parties, for grazing and agricultural
purposes, the surface of the following described patented lode
mining Claims in Gold Mountain Mining District situate in Piute
County, Utah:
[descriptions omitted]
EXPRESSLY EXCEPTING AND RESERVING HOWEVER, unto the
said First Party its successors and assigns, all mines and minerals of
whatsoever kind or nature situate, lying or being on, in or under all or
any of the patented lode mining claims and other property above
described, together with the right and privileges at all times for First
Party its successors and assigns and its and their agents and workmen
to enter into and upon any of said patented lode mining claims and
other property hereinabove described or any part thereof, and to search
for, work, mine, develop, remove, extract, store, treat, mill and carry
away all said mines and minerals of whatever kind or nature the same
may be, and to sink pits and shafts, and to make and drive tunnels,
drifts, winzes and other underground workings of every kind, and to
occupy and use such parts of the surface hereby conveyed for the
construction of such roads and the erection and construction of such
buildings, mills, reduction works and other structures, pipe, power and
transmission lines, dumps, tailings ponds, and other facilities as maybe
necessary in connection with any of said mining, milling, or other
operations, as fully and entirely as if said First Party its successors and
assigns remained the owner in fee simple of said surface, without any
liability whatever on the part of First Party its successors and assigns
to Second Parties and their respective heirs, executors, administrator
and assigns, for any loss, damage or injury that may occur to any
property of Second Parties and their respective heirs, executives,
administrators and assigns, or to said surface by reason of searching
for, working, developing, mining, extracting, storing, treating, milling,
removing and carrying away all of said mines and minerals of every
kind or nature, and/or utilizing said surface as aforesaid in connection
therewith, provided, however, First Party its successors and assigns
shall conduct all of said searching, developing, working, mining,
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storing, treating, milling, removing and transporting operations and all
acts and things connected therewith or incidental thereto in such
manner as will cause as little inconvenience to or interruption of the
use of said Surface by Second Parties and their respective heirs,
executors, administrators and assigns as is consistent with the proper
conduct and carrying on of any of said mining, milling, or other
operations.
Second Parties are hereby given the right to use, for stock watering
purposes, such water rights as First Party may have that are available
and applicable for such purposes... and provided further that said right
of Second Parties to so use said water rights shall not in any manner or
to any extent interfere with or prevent the use thereof for mining or
milling operations by First Party it[s] successors and assigns on any
part of the property of First Part[y].
This conveyance is made expressly subject:
[additional exceptions omitted]
TO HAVE AND TO HOLD the above described surface and building
hereby conveyed unto Second Parties, their heirs, executors,
administrators and assigns forever, subject to the aforesaid exceptions,
reservations and restrictions.
[remainder of Indenture omitted]
(Addendum, Ex. 1 (emphasis added).)
The district court ruled that the Indenture is not ambiguous. [Addendum, Ex. 3,
Tf 4, R. 818-30.] The plain language of the Indenture indicates First Party intended to convey
something less than full rights to the surface of the Property because of the limiting phrase
"for grazing and agricultural purposes" right after the transfer verb "sells." [Id. at % 5.] The
court ruled that the word "for" was intended to show the purposes for which the surface
could be used and that it excludes other purposes. [Id. at ^f 6.] The district court also found
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that the separate conveyance of the one story house was not so limited. [Id. at Tj 9.] Based
on its analysis of the language of the Indenture, the district court ruled that Missouri Flat
owns an easement for grazing and agricultural purposes and to cut and removed aspen and
chaparral trees on the Property, and that Missouri Flat owns the house and the land on which
it is located in fee simple. [Id. at ^f 10.] The court ruled that Gold Mountain owned all other
rights to the surface of the subject property. [Id. at f 12.]
1.

Utah case law holds that a conveyance of property for specified uses creates
an easement.
The district court's ruling is in full accord with the Utah Supreme Court's

decision in Haynes v. Hunt, 85 P.2d 861 (Utah 1939), where the Court construed a deed that
conveyed all ground covered by two lakes with associated rights. The deed provided that
"Said lakes are to be used for the propagation of fish and the removal of the same by the
grantees or assigns." Id. at 862. In determining the nature and extent of the interest granted
by that deed, the Court stated:
The language in the deed to Hunt, "hereby convey and warrant"
normally implies a grant of the fee, but as shown supra the qualifying
clause, "to be used for the propagation offish and the removal of the
same" unless properly descriptive of the premises, is such language as
would naturally be used to qualify or limit the grant, to change it from
a fee to an easement. The description of the property for grant of fee
is complete without this clause, and unless the clause is used to limit or
qualify the grant it can serve no purpose whatsoever. It is an elemental
15

rule of construction that in construing such instruments every word
must be given effect if possible and reasonable, upon the theory that the
grantor used no words except those necessary or convenient to express
the intent of the parties.
Id. at 864 (emphasis added).
Similarly in this action, the Indenture's reference to the surface and the legal
descriptions were sufficient for a complete grant of fee title to the surface. Therefore, the
qualifying clause "for grazing and agricultural purposes" would serve no purpose except to
limit or qualify the grant and change the estate granted from a fee to an easement.
Missouri Flat dismisses the limiting language in the Indenture as simply
describing "the use that was anticipated by the parties at the time of the conveyance of the
surface" but offers no basis for that assertion. The location of that limiting language between
"grants, bargains sells and conveys to Second Parties" and "the surface of the following
described" indicates it was intended to qualify or limit the grant of the surface. Including the
same limiting language again in the subsequent paragraph where First Party separately
conveyed and quitclaimed to Second Parties "for grazing and agricultural purposes" the
surface of separately described property indicates a careful intent to limit both conveyances
of the surface, and not simply to indicate the anticipated uses.
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Indeed, Missouri Flat's argument would render the language superfluous. If
First Party truly intended to convey fee title it would have no reason to describe the
anticipated use, because Second Parties could use it for whatever they wanted. The language
at issue has meaning only if it limits the estate conveyed. The district court noted that the
word "for" is "used as a function word to indicate purpose" and indicates that the phrase was
intended to limit the grant to those purposes, not just to indicate anticipated uses.
[Addendum, Ex. 2., R. 806.]
If the "for grazing and agricultural purposes" limitation is dismissed so that the
Indenture conveys fee title to the surface instead of an easement, other language in the
Indenture is also rendered meaningless. The grant "with the right to cut and remove from
the surface of said Patented Lode Mining Claims and Other Property any or all of the quaking
aspen and chaparral thereon" would be meaningless if the Indentured conveyed fee title to
the surface. A fee owner has the right to use all trees and other resources growing on the
surface however he wants. This language is difficult to dismiss as merely a statement of
other intended uses since the grant is limited to two specific species of trees.
The provision "Together with the one story frame house located in Upper
Kimberly at the fork of the road leading to Sevier and Marysvale, Utah" is also unnecessary
if the Indenture conveyed fee title to the surface. A fee simple conveyance of land on which
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a building is located would normally include the building, so there is no need to separately
convey the house unless the Indenture conveyed only an easement. The separate conveyance
of the house without limiting language is the reason the district court concluded that the
Indenture conveyed fee title to the house and the land on which it was located. Missouri
Flat's contentions that the district court was troubled by this portion of the deed and that the
finding that the house was granted in fee simple required a "tortured analysis" are not
warranted.
2.

Reservation of the Right to Use the Surface for Mining Purposes is Consistent
With the Grant of an Easement.
Missouri Flat contends the reservation of mineral rights and the right to use the

surface for mining operations is totally inconsistent with the grant of an easement, as opposed
to conveying fee title to the surface. However, the reservations are fully consistent with a
grant of an easement. The reservations were not necessary to retain title to the mineral rights
since a conveyance of the surface would not convey the mineral rights but they were
necessary to avoid interfering with the dominant estate of the easement owner.
The mineral owner has the right to use the surface for mineral extraction
whether an easement was granted or the surface was conveyed in fee. Utah law provides that
the owner of a severed mineral estate has a right to use the surface to mine and remove the
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minerals, and the right of the mineral owner to use the surface is considered the dominant
estate. Flying Diamond Corp. v. Rust, 551 P.2d 509, 511 (Utah 1976). Therefore, it was
unnecessary to reserve the right to enter the surface for mining operations if the Indenture
conveyed fee title to the surface.
Under Utah law, an easement is the dominant estate and the owner of the
underlying title or servient estate may only use the property covered by the easement in a
manner that will not interfere with the easement holder's use of the easement. Stevens v.
Bird-Jex Company, 18 P.2d 292,294 (Utah 1933); and Weggeland v. Ujifusa, 384 P.2d 590,
591 (Utah 1963). Since an easement is the dominant estate, the Indenture's expansive
reservation of rights to use the surface for mining and other operations and the waiver of
damages resulting from those uses was necessary to delineate the rights of the mineral and
servient estate owner vis-a-vis the surface easement for grazing and agricultural purposes.
The First Party's right to use the surface for mining and related purposes was to not be
limited by the grant of grazing and agricultural rights in the surface under the Indenture.
The deed construed in Haynes v. Hunt as granting an easement for the stated
purposes also included a reservation "Reserving and excepting therefrom all grazing rights
and privileges and the use of said waters for watering livestock." 85 P.2d at 862. The Utah
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Supreme Court did not consider that reservation of rights to be inconsistent with its finding
that the conveyance of land for the stated purposes granted only an easement.
Missouri Flat also contends that the phrase in the reservation "as fully and
entirely as if said First Party its successors and assigns remained the owner in fee simple of
said surface, without any liability whatsoever on the part of the First Party" is inconsistent
with an intent to convey only an easement. The district court interpreted that language to
indicate the broadest possible right to use the surface for mining and other operations. [Order
If 12, R. 818, 822; Reply to Supplementary Memorandum, R. 645, 655.] The Court's
interpretation is supported by the classical definition of a fee simple estate as "the maximum
legal ownership, and the greatest possible aggregate of rights, powers, privileges and
immunities which a person may have in land." MOYNIHAN, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF
REAL PROPERTY 29 (West Publishing

Co. 1962). This Court has utilized a similar definition

in holding that the estate granted by a tax sale is "'fee simple' title - i.e., one unencumbered
by other claims." A.C. Financial Inc. v. Salt Lake County, 948 P.2d 771, 776 (Utah 1997).
The expansive recitation of uses that can be made of the surface for mining purposes seems
clearly intended to ensure that the interest conveyed by the Indenture would not limit First
Party's use of the surface for mining operations.1
1

It should be noted that the reservation contains language supporting the district
court's interpretation, including the provision that First Party's use of the surface for
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The district court interpreted the right to use the surface "as i f First Party
owned fee title to mean as if First Party owned complete title unencumbered by the easement
or other claims. This interpretation best follows the directive that documents are to be
interpreted "so as to harmonize all of its provisions and all of its terms, and all of its terms
should be given effect if it is possible to do so." Buehner Block Company v. UWC Assoc,
752 P.2d 892, 895 (Utah 1988). "Each ... provision is to be considered in relation to all of
the others with a view toward giving effect to all and ignoring none." Plateau Mining Co. v.
Utah Div. of State Lands and Forestry, 802 P.2d 720, 725 (Utah 1990).2
3.

Haynes v. Hunt is Controlling Authority.
In Haynes v. Hunt, the Utah Supreme Court adopted the rule of construction

that if conveyance language in a deed includes a qualifying clause describing the use to be
made of the property, the statement of use serves to qualify or limit the grant and changes the
estate granted from fee title to an easement. 85 P.2d at 864. The Indenture is precisely that
those purposes "will cause as little inconvenience to or interruption of the use of said
surface" by Second Parties. (Addendum, Exhibit 1 (emphasis added).)
2
Even if the district court's interpretation of the "as if" reference is not considered the
best interpretation standing alone, the other provisions that clearly indicate a grant of
an easement would justify that interpretation. In Coltharp v. Coltharp, 48 Utah 389,
160 P. 121 (1916), the Utah Supreme Court stated: "Moreover, where there are words
or phrases found in different parts of a writing which are repugnant the courts must
if possible, construe the whole instrument so that all of its parts may be brought in
harmony and so that all of its parts may be given some meaning and effect, whether
primary or secondary." Id. at 123.
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kind of deed. There are no other reported Utah cases construing deeds that convey property
for specified purposes, and therefore the rule of construction adopted in Haynes v. Hunt is
controlling and should be followed as this Court interprets the Indenture.
Missouri Flat argues Haynes v. Hunt is not controlling and tries to distinguish
the case on the basis that all of the parties conceded that the deed in Haynes v. Hunt did not
grant fee title. However, there is no indication that the Haynes Court limited its analysis on
that basis. In fact it is clear the Court found the language used in that deed "normally implies
the grant of the fee" but the "qualifying clause 'to be used for the propagation offish and the
removal of the same' ... change[d] it from a fee to an easement." 85 P.2d at 864. Missouri
Flat also claims there was no language in the deed in Haynes v. Hunt inconsistent with a
grant of an easement. However, as noted above, the grantor in that deed reserved the right
to use the property for "grazing rights" and for "watering livestock." Id. In this case,
Missouri Flat has argued that reserving the right to use the surface for mining and related
purposes is inconsistent with a grant of an easement.
4.

Missouri Flat Incorrectly Asserts that Several Utah Cases Support its claim that
the Indenture Conveyed Fee Title to the Surface.
Missouri Flat contends that in the case of Wood v. Ashby, 253 P.2d 351 (Utah

1952), the Utah Supreme Court held the deed in question conveyed fee title despite the fact
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that the "deed to Wood expressly stated that the object was to secure the land for water
gathering purposes." (Aplt's Br. at 18 {emphasis added)) A careful reading of Wood,
however, makes it clear the deed did not expressly state that the object was to secure land for
water gathering purposes. Id. at 353. While it was acknowledged that the grantee's object
in acquiring the land was for water gathering purposes, there is no indication that purpose
was expressly stated in the conveyance language of the deed to Wood. Id. The full language
of the deed is not quoted in the Wood opinion, but all references to the deed state it conveyed
a strip of land referred to as strip A in fee simple. Id. at 352-54.
The issue in Wood was the proper construction of the grantor's reservation of
a "right of way for road purposes across" strip A, not the quantum of the interest or estate
conveyed. The grantor's successor contended that although the deed conveyed fee title to
strip A, the intent of the parties was for the grantor to retain the same right of way over strip
A as he had before the conveyance. In response to that claim, the Wood Court stated:
The deed in question granted a fee simple to Wood reserving a "right
of way for road purposes across" the land conveyed. It is true that the
objective of the grantee was to secure the land for water gathering
purposes, but if the intent of the grantor was to use the land exactly as
before, it seems more likely that an easement rather than a fee simple
would have been granted to Wood.
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Id. at 353. Thus, there was no express limitation in the conveyance. Because there was no
limiting reference to the purpose of the conveyance, the Wood case does not support Missouri
Flat's claim.
Missouri Flat also argues the Utah Supreme Court relied on the rule of
construction that a deed should be interpreted most strongly against the grantor in reaching
its conclusion in Wood v. Ashby. (Aplt's Br. at 13). While the Court acknowledged that rule,
there is no indication the Court reached its decision by construing the deed against the
grantor. The Wood Court's statement on the rules of construction was as follows:
It is generally conceded that a deed is to be construed most strongly
against the grantor, and most favorably to the grantee. It is also
established in this state that a deed should construed so as to effectuate
the intentions and desires of the parties, as manifested by the language
made use of in the deed.
253 P.2d at 353 (internal citations omitted). As note above, the Wood Court concluded there
was nothing in the deed which limited the estate conveyed.
Missouri Flat also incorrectly represents the holding in Ruthrauffv. Silver King
Western Mining & Milling Co., 80 P.2d 338 (Utah 1938), as supporting its interpretation of
the Indenture. Missouri Flat contends the Utah Supreme Court reversed the trial court's
decision on the grounds that a deed which purported to "remise, release and quitclaim" an
undivided interest "conveyed only a limited portion of the property." (Aplt's Br. at 8.)
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Rather, in Ruthrauff'the claim was made that the intent and effect of the deed "was merely
to release" an interest in property, and that it did not convey an interest in the property. The
Utah Supreme Court held the deed conveyed any interest the grantor had, and that it was not
merely a release. Id. at 342.
Gold Mountain does not understand the point Missouri Flat tries to make with
Ruthrauff 'and other cases in the same paragraph of its brief, unless it means to argue that
there is sufficient language in the Indenture to convey fee title to the surface. Gold Mountain
acknowledges that without the limiting clause "for grazing and agricultural purposes" the
grant, bargain, and sale language in the Indenture is sufficient to convey fee title to the
surface of the Property. That is exactly the point made by the Utah Supreme Court in
Haynes v. Hunt, and it was the reason the Court concluded that language served no purpose
except to limit the grant and change it from a fee estate to an easement. Haynes, 85 P.2d at
864.
B.

THE CASE LAW CITED BY MISSOURI FLAT FROM OTHER STATES
SHOULD NOT BE FOLLOWED.
Missouri Flat's Brief relies to a great extent on cases from other states to assert

that a grant of land for stated purposes does not limit the conveyance to an easement. In fact,
the only cases it cites where a conveyance of land for a specified purpose did not create an
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easement are from states other than Utah.3 Missouri Flat argues no public policy reason for
adopting a rule of construction contrary to the rule of Hay nes v. Hunt. Instead, it quotes the
statement from the California case ofCity of Manhattan Beach v. Superior Court, 914 P.2d
160 (Cal. 1996), that "[t]he vast majority of cases hold that the transfer of a fee title is not
vitiated solely for the reason that the deeds contains a clause declaring the purpose for which
it is intended the granted premises shall be used." [Aplt's Br. at 10.] {But see City of
Manhattan Beach, 914 P.2d at 166 n.8 (describing the authorities as in "hopeless conflict"
and that the interaction of the parties to the conveyance is of paramount importance)).
To the contrary, the position taken by the California Supreme Court is not
clearly supported by the "vast majority" of the cases from other states. Indeed, as footnote 8
ofCity ofManhattan Beach states, "most out-of-state cases are of marginal relevance to [the]
grantor's intent because each arises from a particular matrix of facts, which generates its own
3

Missouri Flat's brief cites the Utah cases of Coleman v. Butkovich, 556 P.2d 503,
505 (Utah 1976), and Draziach v. Lasson, 964 P.2d 324, 326-27 (Utah Ct. App.
1998), to support its contention that a deed which contains a reference to specified
land and not a right to use land indicates a grant in fee and not an easement. [Aplt's
Br. at 9.] However, those cases only state that a deed is not effective if it does not
contain an adequate legal description. Coleman, 556 P.2d at 505 (holding that
quitclaim deeds were not invalid because property could be identified with reasonable
certainty from description); Drazich, 964 P.2d at 326-27 (affirming trial court's
decision that legal description was imprecise and conclusion that appellant did not
have an interest in disputed land, and refusing to address issues of adverse possession
and boundary by acquiescence that were not relied upon by the trial court in forming
its decision).
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individual rationale [and] [s]ome also depend upon policy or other considerations not
pertinent to our evaluation." In the Washington case of Brown v. State, 924 P.2d 908 (Wash.
1996) (en banc) cited by Missouri Flat, the Washington Supreme Court stated:
Many courts have considered whether a railroad deed conveys fee
simple title or an easement. See A.E. Korpela, Annotation, Deed to
Railroad Company as Conveying Fee or Easement, 6 ALR 3d 973
(1966). The decisions are in considerable disarray and usually turn on
a case-by-case examination of each deed.
924 P.2d at 911. The American Law Reports annotation referenced by the Washington
Supreme Court reviews numerous cases interpreting deeds to railroad companies. In Section
6[a] titled "Reference to Purpose of Conveyance," the Annotation states:
There is an apparent divergence of opinion with respect to the effect of
[conveyance] language. In some cases the view is taken that such
language is merely descriptive of the use to which the land is to be put
and has no effect to limit or restrict the estate conveyed; in others the
view is taken that although such language may operate to reduce the fee
created from a fee simple to a base, determinable, or conditional fee, it
does not operate to restrict the estate transferred to a mere easement;
and in others the position is taken that such language indicates an
intention to covey an easement only and not a fee.
A.E. Korpela, Deed to Railroad Company as Conveying Fee or Easement, 6 A.L.R. 3d 973, 996
(1966-2004). See also City of Manhattan Beach, 914 P.2d at 166 n.8 (noting that [t]he
authorities are in hopeless conflict [and] cannot be reconciled.)

The Annotation then

discusses the factors influencing the different interpretations and states "and particularly if
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the reference to purpose was in the granting clause, many courts appear ready to construe the
deed as conveying an easement." Id. § 5[a].
When the Utah Supreme Court adopted its rule of construction in Haynes v.
Hunt, it relied on cases from other states and aligned itself with those that hold a conveyance
of property with a statement of purpose serves to limit the estate conveyed to an easement
for the stated uses. The rule articulated in Haynes v. Hunt is also supported by Powell's
treatise on real property, which states as follows:
A conveyance frequently requires careful scrutiny to determine which
kind of interest was intended to be created by the parties. There is a
general construction preference for one of two possible meanings
which is "against the grantor." When, however, the problem requires
distinguishing an "easement" from an "estate" the generally prevailing
attitude is favorable to the finding of an easement wherever it serves the
manifested purpose of the parties. Thus, a conveyance permitting the
convey ee to make stated uses of the land, or even to have the exclusive
use of the land for a particular purpose, is normally construed to create
an easement, and to leave in the conveyor all privileges of use not
inconsistent with the easement.
POWELL ON L A W OF REAL PROPERTY

§ 34.04, at 34-40.
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C.

THE RULES OF CONSTRUCTION RELIED UPON BY MISSOURI FLAT
DO NOT SUPPORT ITS INTERPRETATION OF THE INDENTURE.
Missouri Flat cites various rules of construction to persuade the Court to favor

its interpretation of the Indenture. However, those rules of construction are not applicable
to the Indenture in this case.
First, Missouri Flat relies upon Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-3 and annotations to
it. Section 57-1-3 states:
A fee simple title is presumed to be intended to pass by a conveyance
of real estate, unless it appears from the conveyance that a lesser estate
was intended.
Id. (emphasis added). This statute does not support an interpretation that the Indenture
conveyed a fee interest because the district court's order concluded that the language of the
Indenture indicated that "a lesser state was intended." Both parties agree the Indenture
limited the interest conveyed to the surface of the Property, and the issue was whether it was
intended to convey a lesser estate in the surface. The statute does not impose a presumption
in determining what estate is intended where there is language in the conveyance that limits
the estate conveyed.
Missouri Flat next relies uponJacobson, etal. v. Jacobson, etai, 557 P.2d 156
(Utah 1976). The Court in Jacobson, however, did not interpret language used in a
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conveyance. Instead, the deed in Jacobson conveyed unlimited fee title but the grantors
sought to use parol evidence to show the document was intended to be an equitable mortgage
and not a conveyance of title. Id. at 157. The other cases Missouri Flat cites along with
Jacobson also involve attempts to use parol evidence to show an intent not reflected in the
documents, and were not cases construing conveyance language. Those cases held the
documents would be presumed to convey the interests stated, and that the party attempting
to show a different intent by parol evidence had the burden of overcoming the presumption
that the document means what it says, by clear and convincing evidence. That standard has
not been applied to favor one construction over another in cases construing the language of
a conveyance. Missouri Flat cites no case where the clear and convincing evidence standard
was applied in construing the language of a deed.
Missouri Flat also argues the Indenture is ambiguous and therefore the Court
should rule in its favor based on the subsequent conduct of Missouri Flat and its
predecessors. This argument is wholly inconsistent with Missouri Flat's representations in
the telephonic hearing of April 16, 2003. The following dialogue took place during that
hearing:
THE COURT: Now, in terms of the status of this case, this is
a Motion For Summary Judgment in which both sides are
saying, "The deed says what it says and we're not offering any
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extraneous evidence about the intention of the parties. Just look
at the deed and try and determine what the intent of the parties
was within the four corners of the document." Right, Mr.
Russell?
MR. RUSSELL: That's correct.
Ah, the deed says what it says. It's a record. It's an old deed. I don't
know that were gonna get a lot of, ah - - well, I don't know if extrinsic
evidence would be admissible to show what the parties meant. But I
don't know that we could find anybody to tell us what they thought.
(T. 20-21.) Since Missouri Flat represented to the District Court that it was not offering any
extrinsic evidence, it may not raise the issue on appeal. Oliphant v. Estate ofBrunetti, et al.,
2002 UT App 375, \ 22,64 P.3d 587 (party who did not argue parol evidence against motion
for summary judgment below was precluded from raising it on appeal).
Finally, Missouri Flat argues the Indenture should be construed most strongly
against the grantor because the language of the Indenture either clearly shows the intent to
convey fee title or it is ambiguous. That contention simply cannot be supported. An
agreement or a contract provision is not ambiguous just because the parties disagree as to its
meaning. Plateau Mining Co., 802 P.2d at 725. Also, arbitrary rules of construction such
as construing a conveyance most strongly against the grantor should not be applied unless
the intention of the grantor cannot be determined from the language of the deed.
Haynes v. Hunt, the Utah Supreme Court stated that:
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In

When the intention of the parties to a deed or contract can be
ascertained from it, such intention will prevail, unless in contravention
of some rule of law; and, when such intention can be ascertained,
arbitrary rules of law are not to be invoked, and will not control the
construction of the instrument.
85 P.2d at 863 (quoting Kirwin v. Farr, 53 P. at 609). In Russell v. Geyser-Marion Gold
Mining Co., 423 P.2d 487 (Utah 1967), the Utah Supreme Court stated that "This rule of
construction favoring grantees is one of the last rules of construction that should be applied
and need not be resorted to so long as a satisfactory result can be reached by other more
reliable rules." Id. at 490.
D.

MISSOURI FLAT FAILED TO PRESERVE CLAIMS OF LACHES,
ESTOPPEL AND ADVERSE POSSESSION FOR APPELLATE REVIEW.
Missouri Flat argues it is entitled to a trial on the merits of its claims of adverse

possession, laches, and estoppel, contending that the trial court granted summary judgment
on those issues. (Aplt's Br., pp. 22-23,27-28.) To the contrary, the trial court did not grant
summary judgment on those issues but instead disposed of the claims because Missouri Flat
had failed to pursue them.
To properly preserve an issue for appellate review a party must raise it below
such that the trial court is given "an opportunity to rule on [the] issue." Badger, et al. v.
Brooklyn Canal Co., et al, 966 P.2d 844, 847 (Utah 1998). The purpose.of this rule is to put
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the trial judge "on notice of the asserted error" and to allow "the opportunity for correction
at that time in the course of the proceeding." Id. (quoting Broberg v. Hess, 782 P.2d 198,
201 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)). For a trial court to be "afforded an opportunity to rule on the
issue," the appellant must meet three (3) requirements. First, the issue must be raised in a
timely fashion.

Second, the issue must be "sufficiently raised . . . to a 'level of

consciousness5 before the trial court. . .." Third, the appellant must introduce supporting
evidence or relevant legal authority to support its argument. Hart v. Salt Lake County
Commission, et al, 945 P.2d 125, 130 (Utah Ct. App. 1997).
Here, Missouri Flat cannot satisfy those requirements. First, the issues were
not raised "timely" in response to the trial court's question at the hearing. While arguments
of adverse possession, laches, and estoppel had been pleaded and addressed in Missouri
Flat's briefing [Amended Answer and Counterclaim, R. 447-457, and Memorandum in
Opposition to Second MSJ, R. 659-777], its answer to the trial judge's question showed it
had determined to no longer pursue the issues and that the trial court need not decide them.
(T. 20-24.) Second, the same failure also demonstrates the issues were not sufficiently raised
to a "level of consciousness" before the trial court. The purpose of these requirements is to
give the trial court "the opportunity for a correction at that time in the course of the
proceeding." Badger, 966 P.2d at 847 (quoting Broberg, 782 P.2d at 201). When the trial
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judge asked if there were any other issues to be decided, Missouri Flat's negative response
removed those issues from the trial court's "level of consciousness," even assuming it had
sufficiently raised them in the first place. Because Missouri Flat failed to timely bring those
issues to the trial court's consciousness so they could be addressed before a final order was
entered, it cannot now seek a trial on the merits of those claims.
Moreover, when Gold Mountain submitted the proposed Order, Missouri Flat
did not object that the Order would resolve the issues of adverse possession, laches, or
estoppel. The trial court's Decision did not address any of those claims. ®. 804-08). If
Missouri Flat intended to pursue them as it now contends on appeal, its duty was to object
to the proposed Order or otherwise raise to a "level of consciousness" the trial court's lack
of ruling on the issues. Only by so doing would the trial court have had the "opportunity for
a correction at that time in the course of the proceeding." Missouri Flat's failure to do so was
a consent to the Order against it on the issues of adverse possession, laches, and estoppel.4
4

This Court has held that the "mere mention of an issue in the pleadings, when no
supporting evidence or relevant legal authority is introduced at trial in support of the
claim, is insufficient to raise an issue at trial and thus insufficient to preserve the issue
for appeal." LeBaron & Associates, Inc. v. Rebel Enterprises, Inc., et al, 823 P.2d
479,483 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). In this action, the matter was decided after a hearing
on dispositive motions and not at trial. The rule articulated in LeBaron required
Missouri Flat to raise "supporting evidence or relevant legal authority" at the hearing,
and not simply to rely upon the mention of those issues in its briefing, to preserve the
issues of laches, estoppel, and adverse possession for appellate review.
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Finally, it should be clear that Gold Mountain's proposed Order was not
submitted with the intent to take advantage of Missouri Flat on those issues, nor did it have
that effect. Missouri Flat's amended pleading before the trial court raised multiple claims
as parties commonly do. However, its arguments at the hearing focused entirely on the
interpretation of the Indenture, and its representations to the trial court indicated it had
determined not to pursue the issues of adverse possession, laches, or estoppel. Because this
action was filed to quiet title to the underlying property, the trial court's Decision needed to
be implemented by an order which addressed all claims Missouri Flat had asserted, even if
some were later abandoned. Moreover, the Order would not be final under Rule 54(b) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure unless it disposed of all claims between the parties. Bradbury,
et al v. Valencia, et al, 2000 UT 50, f 10, 5 P.3d 649 ("To be final, the trial court's order or
judgment must dispose of all parties and claims to an action.")
For those reasons, Gold Mountain's proposed Order presented the simple
conclusions that "Gold Mountain's claims against Missouri Flat in this matter are not barred
by latches [sic] or estoppel" and that "Missouri Flat has not established any rights or title in
the Subject Property . . . by adverse possession." (Addendum, Exhibit 3.) The Order was
entered without any objection by Missouri Flat. Therefore, the Court should conclude that
Missouri Flat abandoned its claims of adverse possession, laches, and estoppel in the trial
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court and failed to preserve them for appellate review.
E.

MISSOURI FLAT CANNOT PREVAIL ON ITS CLAIM OF TITLE BASED
ON ADVERSE POSSESSION.
The critical aspect of Missouri Flat's adverse possession argument is that it

claims title beyond the rights granted under the Indenture as interpreted by the district court.
Missouri Flat argued below that "[E]ven if the Court were to adopt the interpretation of the
Indenture proposed by plaintiff, Missouri Flat and its predecessors have overcome any
limitation in the language of the Indenture by adverse possession."

[Supplementary

Memorandum, R. 477.] Thus, the argument presumes Gold Mountain is the owner of legal
title to the surface of the Property, subject to an easement to use the surface for grazing and
agricultural purposes and to cut and remove aspen and chaparral trees. As the owner of legal
title, Gold Mountain is entitled to the presumptions of possession afforded by Utah Code
Ann. §78-12-7 as follows:
In every action for the recovery of real property, or the possession
thereof, the person establishing a legal title to the property shall be
presumed to have been possessed thereof within the time required by
law; and the occupation of the property by any other person shall be
deemed to have been under and in subordination to the legal title,
unless it appears that the property has been held and possessed
adversely to such legal title for seven years before the commencement
of the action.
Id.
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Utah courts have held that to overcome the presumption of possession under
the statute, the party claiming adverse possession "must be able to show possession such that
the legal titleholder is put on notice" that he is claiming adversely to the legal titleholder.
Such notice must be based on "conduct clearly inconsistent with the rights of the titleholder."
Dillman v. Foster, 656 P.2d 974, 980 (Utah 1982). In the recent case of Salt Lake County v.
Metro West Ready Mix, Inc., 2004 UT 23, f23, 89 P.3d 155, the Utah Supreme Court held
that to overthrow the presumption that the adverse party is not under subordination to the
legal owner's title, the party claiming adversely has the burden to establish the fact by
competent evidence. Id. (quoting English v. Openshaw, 28 Utah 241, 78 P. 476, 477
(1904)). Because of the gravity of adverse possession claims - wresting title from otherwise
rightful owners - claimants must strictly comply with all legal requirements. Metro West,
2004 UT 23, f 23 (quoting Martin v. Kearl, 917 P.2d 91, 93 n.5 (Utah Ct. App. 1996)).
Missouri Flat does not claim it or its predecessors have occupied or possessed
the Property for any purpose other than for grazing livestock. The use of the surface for
grazing livestock is deemed to be pursuant to the easement granted since the Indenture
expressly grants the right to use the surface for grazing and agricultural purposes. Therefore,
such use and possession has not been hostile or adverse to Gold Mountain. Missouri Flat and
its predecessors have done nothing to invade Gold Mountain's non-grazing and non37

agricultural interests in the surface in such a manner as would give notice of an adverse
claim.

Without possession that is clearly adverse to Gold Mountain's fee interest and

presumed possession, Missouri Flat cannot succeed in its claim for adverse possession as a
matter of law.5
Missouri Flat also claims the benefit of Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-8 because it
entered upon the surface under a claim of title. As noted above, it cannot use the Indenture
to support a claim of title because its claim of adverse possession is based on the presumption
that the Indenture granted an easement and First Party retained legal title. A grant of an
easement cannot be used to support a claim of title because an easement is not considered a
fee title interest. Chournos, et al v. D 'Angillo, et ai, 642 P.2d 710,712 (Utah 1982) (a right
of way is an easement not an interest in fee simple).
Missouri Flat also asserts it entered possession under claim of title based on
the Trustee's Deed by which it acquired its interest in the surface of the subject property.
5

Because Missouri Flat has a right to use the surface under the easement, this situation
is similar to cotenancy cases where the occupying cotenant that has a right of
possession is claiming adversely to the other cotenants. The Utah Courts have stated
in those cases that for the occupying cotenant's possession to be considered adverse
to the other co-tenants "the words or acts must be openly direct and hostile to the
cotenancy relationship." Massey v. Prothero, et ai, 664 P.2d 1176, 1180 (Utah
1983). Missouri Flat has not asserted any use except that granted by the easement
which clearly is not conduct directly hostile to Gold Mountain's title to the servient
estate.
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However, since the Trustee's Deed is effective as of July 19,1994, and this action was filed
in March, 2000, Missouri Flat cannot claim to have possessed the surface under the Trustee's
Deed for the seven years required by Utah Code Ann. §78-12-8.
It is correct that the parties "disagree on the evidence concerning the payment
of taxes" on the surface of the Property. (Aplt's Br., pp. 22-23, 27-28.) However, even if
Missouri Flat could show it had paid all taxes on the surface, the Utah Supreme held in
Dillman v. Foster that the "payment of taxes, standing alone, is insufficient to support" a
claim of adverse possession. 656 P.2d at 980. Since Missouri Flat cannot show that it has
possessed the surface adversely to Gold Mountain, the conflicting claims of payment of taxes
do not have to be addressed for this Court to rule against Missouri Flat's claim of adverse
possession.
F.

MISSOURI FLAT CANNOT PREVAIL ON ITS CLAIMS OF LACHES OR
ESTOPPEL.
The Utah Supreme Court has held that to successfully assert laches two

elements must be established: "(1) The lack of diligence on the part of plaintiff; (2) An injury
to the defendant owing to such lack of diligence." Papanikolas Brothers Enterprises v.
Sugarhouse Shopping Center Assoc, et aL, 535 P.2d 1256, 1260 (Utah 1975); see also
Plateau Mining, 802 P.2d at 731.
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Missouri Flat cannot show unreasonable lack of diligence or injury. Since
Missouri Flat and its predecessors have done nothing to give Gold Mountain or its
predecessors notice that they claimed more than the right to use the Subject Property for
grazing purposes, nothing has happened that would require diligence in making further
inquiry as to the interests claimed or in bringing an action to confirm the rights of the parties.
Missouri Flat's only claim of injury is that there has been a "loss of relevant witnesses."
However, as noted above, Missouri Flat informed the district court that the Indenture was to
be construed based on the language of the Indenture and it was not offering any extraneous
evidence about the intention of the parties. Therefore loss of relevant witnesses is a nonissue.
Estoppel is an equitable defense that is similar to laches but requires more than
mere delay. As Missouri Flat notes in its brief the requirements for estoppel are:
(1) an admission, statement, or act inconsistent with the claim
afterwards asserted, (2) action by the other party on the faith of such
admission, statement, or act, and (3) injury to such other party resulting
from allowing the first party to contradict or repudiate such admission,
statement, or act.
Consolidated Coal Co. v. Division of State Lands and Forestry, et al.9 886 P.2d 514, 522
(Utah 1994). Missouri Flat notes that the first requirement can be met by failure to act, but
that applies only if the party otherwise has a duty to act. Morgan, et al v. Board of State
40

Lands, et al, 549 P.2d 695,697 (Utah 1976) ("or by his silence when he ought to speak...").
The Morgan case also requires that the person claiming reliance must "act[] with reasonable
prudence and diligence" based upon such failure to act. Id.
Because Missouri Flat's only basis for claiming estoppel is silence or inaction
on the part of Gold Mountain and its predecessors, it must show there was "silence when
[they] ought to speak" that "induced" Missouri Flat and its predecessors to act "with
reasonable prudence and diligence" to their detriment. Here there is no relationship between
Gold Mountain or its predecessors and Missouri Flat or its predecessors that imposes any
duty to speak or act or inquire as to the interest Missouri Flat and its predecessors believed
they owned in the Property. Missouri Flat does not allege that either it or its predecessors,
or Gold Mountain or its predecessors, have acted in any way inconsistent with the rights
granted and reserved by the Indenture as construed by the district court. In addition, there
has been no cognizable injury. The claim of injury is deterioration of evidence due to loss
of relevant witnesses. However, under the claims made in this case, the testimony of such
witnesses would be irrelevant.
Missouri Flat has cannot support its claims of laches or estoppel, and the district court
properly disposed of them in its Order.
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VII.

CONCLUSION: RELIEF SOUGHT.
The district court's order should be affirmed and this Court should rule that the

Indenture granted to Missouri Flat's predecessors (Second Parties) an easement for the uses
specified in the Indenture, that it conveyed fee title to the house and the land on which it sits,
and that Gold Mountain's predecessor (First Party) retained all other rights and ownership
in the Property. That interpretation of the Indenture is in harmony with controlling Utah case
law and is necessary to give meaning and effect to all provisions of the Indenture. Case law
from other states that is contrary to Utah case law should be disregarded.
The district court's Order regarding adverse possession, laches, and estoppel
should be affirmed. Missouri Flat has abandoned those claims in the trial court and has not
preserved them for appellate review. Moreover, the facts cannot support those claims on the
merits, and the district court properly disposed of them against Missouri Flat.
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DATED this / S ^ a y of November, 2004.

W_
RICHARD G. ALLEN

RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER
& NELSON

(

MATTHEW C. BARNECK
Attorneys for Gold Mountain
Development LLC
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the J ^ ^ d a y of November, 2004, two (2) true and
correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE, were served by United States mail,
first class postage prepaid, on the following:
Carolyn B. McHugh, Esq.
Ronald G. Russell, Esq.
PARR WADDOUPS BROWN GEE & LOVELESS
185 South State Street, Suite 1300
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
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3 . #62039
THIS INDENTURE made t h i s 2 6 t h d a y o f A p r i l , A.D. 1 9 5 1 , by and b e t w e e n ANNIE LAURIE CONSOLIDATED

GOLD MINES, a Utah c o r p o r a t i o n , F i r s t P a r t y , and FRANKLIN TAFT PAIION, CLAINE TAD PAXTON, GENEVIEVE P .
RAJSON, and OERALDINS PAXTON, a l l o f Kanoah, Utah,

Second P a r t i e s ,

W I T N E S S E T H *

That F i r s t Party, e i p r e s s l y subject to the exceptions and reservations i n favor of F i r s t Party
i t s successors and assigns hereinafter mentioned and s e t f o r t h , for and m consideration of the sum of
One Thousand Dollars ($1,000 00) and other good and valuable considerations paid by Second Barties, the
receipt whereof i s hereby acknowledged, hereby grants, bargains, s e l l a and conveys unto Second Parties,
for grazing and agricultural purposes, the surface of the following described Patented Lode Mining Claima
i n Gold Mountain Mining D i s t r i c t , and the surface only of the Other Property described below, with the
right to cut and remove from the surface of oaid Patented Lode Mining Claime and Other Property any or
a l l of the quaking aspen and c h a p a r r a l thereon, a l l of said mining claims and property being situated
in Piute and Sevier Counties, State of Utah, to-witi
Patented Lode Mining Claimsr
Sevier, Gulch, Adaline and Sevier Mill S i t e i n 0*. S. Lot #37.
Blue Bird, Red Bird, Blue Bird Fraction, Last Chance, Grass Hopper and Frank Jay i n
<J. 3 . Lot #3U88.
L i l l i a n , Senator Stewart, Annie Laurie, Chief Devora, Royal George, National, H. S. & S,
Overland and Minnie "Maude i n U. S. Lot #3207.
Lincoln and Garfield in U. S. Lot #Uul9.
Sevier Extension, Pointer, Erie, Erie Fraction, Sevier Extension Group and Sevier
Consolidated Mill Site i n U. S. Lots Nos. u69u~A, u69u~B and U69U-C.
Fraction A, Gold Mountain H. 4. J . t Pioneer Mine, Utica No. 1, Utxca Ittne Ho. 2 and
W. F. i n U. 3 . Lots Nos. U710 and U769.
Dunmore, Bunker H i l l , Free Prees and Fourth of July i n U. 3 . Lot #UU21.
Senator Cannon i n U. S, Lot #Ulil5«
Rolling H i l l s No. 2, Rolling H i l l s , Weber, Maid of the Mist No. 2 , Maid of the Mist
«o. u, H i l l s i d e No. 3 ,

riillaiae

Ho. u) Jessie No. 6, Stanley, ICua of the Mist,

H i l l s i d e , Hillside No. 2 , J e s s i e No. 5 , Jessie No. 1 , Jessie No. 2 , J e s s i e No. 3 |
J e s s i e No. U and Maid of the Mist No. 3 i n U. 3 . Lots Hoa^ l*l<01 and uixl6.
Roiling H i l l s No. U, Rolling H i l l s No. 3 , Gold Bird No. 2, Rolling H i l l s No. 6, Rolling
H i l l s No. $, Weber No. 2 and ffeber No. 3 in U. S. Lots Host Ukh2, Uh$) and hh$$.
Pride of America No. 3 , Pnde of America No. 2 , Maid of the Mist Ho. $, Maid of the Mist
No. 6 , Hillside No. $, H i l l s i d e No. 7, Hillside No. 6, Hillside No. 8. Jessie No. 7 ,

Exhibit C

Jessie No. 8, Je*,-ie No. 9, Jessie No. 10 and Gold Bird Nos. 3 to 18, bo^,i inclusive,
in U. S. Lots Nos. UUi2, UtS3 and Ui$5.

Bird of all Birds in U. S. Lot #Ut62.

James G. Blaine, Surprise, Outzen, II. J. & S., Hazel Kirk, Morton, Lookout, Snow
Girl and Mogul in U. S. Lots U291 and 1*301.

Blue Ledge, Lookout, No. 1, No. 2, Miller Fraction, Southerly Extension of No. 2,
No. 1 Fraction, Extension of the Erie, Ute Fraction, Ote, Blister, and Fish Creek
Millsite in U. 8. Lots Nos. hh30A and UU30B.

Gold City in U. S. Lot No. 3851.

Holland and Placer Gulch in U. S. Lot No. 333b.

Deer Park and D. J. in 0. S. Lot No. Ui$7.

Dandy Quill in U. S. Lot No. 38$0.

Outzen Fraction in U. S. Lot No. It96$#

Tom Boy and Edith in U. S. Lot No. It939.

Good Enough, Horse Shoe, Horse Shoe Fraction No. 2, Geo. S. Fraction, Crown Point,
Palmer G. Breckenridge No. 2, Basin Fraction, Fort Dodge, Mineral Point, Statehood,
Good Enough Fraction, Horse Shoe Fraction, Geo. S., Oro Chain, Mascot Fraction,
Palmer G. Fraction, Basin, Capt. Dodge, Dodge Fraction, Mineral Point Fraction and
Mammoth in u\ S. Lot No. 6uUiu

Overland Fraction In 0. S. Lot No. 1*586.
Together with the one story frame house located in Upper Klmberly at the fork of the road
Leading to Sevier and Marysvale, Utah.
Other Propertyt
The North one-half, and the Northwest Quarter of the Southwest Quarter, and Lots 1,
2, 3, u, and $ of. Section 36, Townahip 26 South, Range $ Wast, Salt Lake Meridian,

And for the consideration aforesaid First Party hereby conveys and quit claims unto Second
Parties, for gracing and agricultural purposes, the surface of the .following described patented lode
mining Claims in Gold Mountain Mining District situate in Piute County, Utaht
Annie Mine, Geneva, Fenny Mining Claim and Switzerland, Survey No. $297.

Columbia Mine, Yukon Mine, U. S« Treasury Mine, Britannia, Klondike Mine, Bank of
England,- excluded area in conflict with $139 LeRoy Mining Claim, Sur. No. $0U5
Halifax No. 6 - Sunr. No. $17l».
EXPRSSSLT EXCEPTING AND RESERVING HOWEVER, unto the said First Party its successors and assigns,
all mines and minerals of whatsoever kii*d at

Aatura situata, lying or being on, in sr \<nd*r all or any

of the patented lode mining claims and other property above described, together with the righ* and privileges at all times for First Party its successors and assigns and its and their agents and workmen to
enter into and upon all or any of said patented lode mining claims and other property hereinabove described or any part thereof, and to search for, work, mine, develop, remove, extract, store, treat, mill
and carry away all said mines and minerals of whatever kind or nature the same may be., and to sink pits
and shafts, and to make and drive tunnels, drifts, winzes and other underground workings of every kind,
and to occupy and use such parts of the surface hereby conveyed for the construction of such roads and

_.„.., «.»« u^«3r structures, pipe* {tourer
and transmission lines

*>s, tailinga ponds, and other facilities, aa may b.

/ceaaary in connection

with any of aaid mining, milling, or other operationa, aa fully and entirely aa if a aid Firat Party ita
aucceaaora and aaalgna remained the owner in fee aimple of aaid surface, without any liability whatever
on the part of Firat Party ita aucceaaora or aaalgna to Second Parties and their respective heirs, executors, adminiatratora and aaalgna, for any loaa, damage or injury that may occur to any property o£ Second
Parties and their reapective heira, executors, adminiatratora and aaalgna, or to aaid surface by reason
of searching for, working, developing, mining, extracting, atoring, treating, milling, removing and
carrying away all of aaid minea and minerals of every kind or nature, and/or utilizing aaid surface aa
aforeaaid in connection therewith, provided, however, Firat Party ita aucceaaora and aasigna ahall conduct
all of said searching, developing, working, mining, atoring, treating, milling, removing and transporting
operations and all acts and things connected therewith or incidental thereto in such manner as will cause
as little inconvenience to or interruption of the use of said Surface by Second Partiea and their reapective heirs, executors, adminiatratora and aaalgna aa la conaiatent with the proper conduct and carrying on
of any of aaid mining, milling, or other operationa.
Second Partiea are h-rsby given the right to use, for stock watering purposes, such water rights
as First Party may have that are available and applicable for auch purposes, provided, however, Second
Parties, their heirs, executors, administrators and assigns, ahall not do or permit anything to be done
which will in any manner or to any extent impair or destroy any of the water rights of First Party, and
First Party its succeasors and assigns shall not be liable or reaponaible for any failure or dlarlnution of
any of said water rlghta, and provided further that aaid right of Second Partiea to ao uae said water
rights shall not In any manner or to any extent interfere with or prevent the uae thereof for mining or
milling operations by First Party it successors and assigns on any part of the property of First Part,
This conveyance is made expreasly aubjectt
(a)

to any and all property taxes or other taxes that may be levied or assessed

for the year 1951 and thereafter upon any of the surface rights hereby convevedj
(b)

To all existing highways, roads, easements and rights of way and subject to

the right of First Party, its aucceaaora or aasigna, to use and enjoy auch highwaya,
roads, easements and rights of way in common with others} and
(c)

To the right of First Party, its successors and assigns to enter into and

upon the surface hereby conveyed for the purpose of dismantellng or removing any and
all buildings and other structures (excepting on ly the one story frame house located
in Upper Kimberly at the fork of the road leading to Sevier and Uarysvalt, Utah),
machinery, equipment, supplies, pipe, power, transmission and other lines, and any and
all other personal property situated upon any part of the aurf ace hereby conveyed.
TO HAVE AMD TO HOLD the above deacribed aurf ace and building hereby conveyed unto Second Parties,
their heirs, executors, adminiatratora and assigns forever, subject to the aforesaid exceptions, reservations and restrictions*
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, First Party has caused these presents to be executed in its corporate name
by its proper officers thereunto duly author!ted and its corporate seal to be hereto affixed the day and
year first above written*
$22,00 in U. S. Revenue
Stamps Attached

ATTEST?
Robert E. Mark

STATS OF UTAH
COUNTT OF SALT LAKE

(CORPORATE SEAL)

ANHIE LAURIE CONSOLIDATED GOLD JOKES
By

Charlea L* Wheeler
President

)
) SS
)

On the 16th day of May, 1951, personally appeared before me Charlea L. Wheeler who being by me
duly sworn did say that he is the President of Annie Laurie Consolidated Qold Mines, and that the within

going instruiaent was signed in

^half of said corporation by authority ot

resolution of its

directors and said Charles L„ Iheeler duly acknowledged to me that .said corporation executed
and that the seal affixed is the seal of said corporation*
SEAL)
ssion Expiresr

Paul S« Roberts
Notary Public For the State of
utah
» residing at Uurray City, Utah

11, 1951
at the request of Taft Paxton this 20th day of July A«D., 1951 at lOtOO A« M*
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DISTRICT COURT, PIUTE COUNTY, UTAH
Piute County Courthouse
Junction, Utah 84740
Telephone: 435-577-2841 Fax: 435-577-2433
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GOLD MOUNTAIN DEVELOPMENT LLC,
Plaintiff,

1 DECISION ON MOTIONS FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Case No. 000600006

vs.
MISSOURI FLAT LTD., and others,

Assigned Judge: DAVID L. MOWER

Defendants.

Cross-motions for summary judgment require me to interpret a document. There is no
dispute about the words in the document, neither is it claimed to be ambiguous. The document is
entitled "Indenture." It is a title transfer document. I will refer to it as a deed. The grantor was
plaintiffs predecessor. The grantee was defendant Missouri Flat's predecessor.
The dispute centers on this question: Who owns the land?
Plaintiff wants this Court to sign
[5.] A judgment and decree quieting fee title ... in Plaintiff, subject to the
easements for grazing and agricultural purposes and to cut and remove quaking
aspen and chaparral now owned by [defendant].... (Language taken directly from
paragraph 5 of the Prayer for Relief in the Complaint filed April 4, 2000)
The defendant wants the Court to
... [E]nter ... a decree ... declaring that [defendant] is the owner all of surface rights ...

DECISION ON MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, Case number 000600006, Page -2(From paragraph b. or the Prayer for Relief in the Counterclaim filed May 5,2000)
In other words, defendant wants to own the entire surface. Plaintiff wants to own the land,
but the ownership would be subject to defendant's right to use the surface for certain purposes.
The deed is a long and wordy document. In it, the phrase "First Party" refers to Plaintiff,
while "Second Parties" refers to Defendant. I have used my word processor to key in almost
every word in it (I will include this work as an endnote to this decision.)1 Then I have removed
words not essential to my analysis. Here is the result (with emphasis on certain words added by
me):
First Party ... hereby grants, bargains, sells and conveys unto Second
Parties, for grazing and agricultural purposes, the surface of..., with the right
to cut and remove from the surface ... any or all of the quaking aspen and
chaparral thereon....
Patented Lode Mining Claims
(A list whose details are not important to my analysis)
Together with the one story frame house located in ....
Other Property:
(A list as above.)
... RESERVING-., unto the ... First Party ... the right and privilege ... to
enter ... upon ... and to occupy ... such parts of the surface ... as may be necessary
... as fully and entirely as if... First Party... had remained the owner ....
TO HAVE AND TO HOLD the above described surface and building ...
unto Second Parties ... forever, subject to the ... exceptions, reservations and
restrictions.

DECISION ON MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, Case number 000600006, Page -3-

I conclude that defendant owns the following:
1.

The frame building and that portion of the surface which it covers in fee
simple absolute; and

2.

a permanent easement to use all the rest of the surface for grazing and
agricultural purposes, subject to plaintiffs right to enter for certain
purposes.

Here are the reasons why I have reached my conclusion. First, the plain language of the
deed indicates that the grantor intended to convey something less than the full rights to the
surface. The specific words are, "First Party ... sells ... unto Second Parties, for grazing and
agricultural purposes ...." The limiting phrase is that which is shown in bold face. It begins
with the word "for," which means "used as a function word to indicate purpose." From MerriamWebster Online Dictionary, http://www.m-w.com. The limiting phrase is positioned within 3
words of the transfer verb "sells."
The use of the word "for" was intended to show the purpose for which the surface could
be used. By the same token, it excludes all other such purposes.
Second, the grantor reserved something unto itself. Specifically, the grantor reserved
unto itself the right to enter and to occupy. Such a reservation can only be consistent with a grant
of less than the full rights to the surface.
Third, the use of the words "to have and to hold ..." do not necessarily mean that the grant

DECISION ON MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, Case number 000600006, Page -4is one of fee simple absolute. It appears to me that that which was granted forever was "the
above described surface," the rights to which had already been described and limited.
Fourth, it appears that the grant of the building was made in fee simple absolute as to the
surface because it was permanently attached to the land and the grantor must have wanted to give
the grantee exclusive use and control of it.
Mr. Allen is appointed to draft an appropriate order and to submit it for execution by
following the procedures set forth in Rule 4-504, Code of Judicial Administration.

DECISION ON MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, Case number 000600006, Page -5CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
On May 3b , 2003 a copy of this DECISION ON MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT was sent by M=first- class mail, P=Clerk's office pickup box, F=Fax to:
Addressee

Method
/»

Richard G. Allen
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 254
Lehi, UT 84043
Ronald G. Russell
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 11019
Salt Lake City, UT 84147

Addressee
Warren HL Peterson
Attorney at Law
362 W. Main St.
Delta, UT 84624

Method

fh

fn
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RICHARD G. ALLEN (A0048)
2975 West Executive Parkway
Suite 200
Lehi, Utah 84043
Telephone: (801) 766-1580
Fax: (801) 407-8380
Attorney for Plaintiff
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TR*GTCCOURT
£ i h DISTRICT
PJUTE^pUf^TY
CLERK
_

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR PIUTE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

GOLD MOUNTAIN DEVELOPMENT
LLC, a Utah Limited Liability Company,
Plaintiff,

!
FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND
ORDER AND DECREE

v.
MISSOURI FLAT LTD., a Utah Limited
Partnership, TERREL WOODARD
SANDBERG and CYNTHIA CRANE
SANDBERG, husband and wife,
individuals, WILLIAM OHLINGER, an
individual, KIMBERLY GOLD, INC, a
New York Corporation, and DOES I TO X,
parties unknown,

Civil No. 000600006
Judge David L. Mower

Defendants,

Cross-motions for Summary Judgment were filed by plaintiff Gold Mountain
Development, LLC ("Gold Mountain") and defendant Missouri Flat Ltd ("Missouri Flat") in
the above entitled matter and several hearings have been held on those motions. Gold

Mountain was represented by Richard G. Allen. Missouri Flat was represented by Warren
Peterson and Richard Waddingham of Waddingham & Peterson and by Ronald Russell of Parr
Waddoups Brown Gee & Loveless.
After reviewing the cross-motions and the memoranda, exhibits and affidavits in
support of the same and considering the arguments of counsel and being fully advised in the
premises and for good cause shown, the Court makes the following findings of fact,
conclusions of law and order and decree in this matter.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. Gold Mountain filed this action to clear up title problems set out in the Complaint
and to quiet title in Gold Mountain to certain patented mining claims and other real property
described in Exhibit A to the Complaint (the "Subject Property"). The Subject Property is
also described in EXHIBIT A hereto.
2. Gold Mountain has obtained judgment against or dismissed all defendants except for
Missouri Fiat.
3. Gold Mountain seeks a judgment and decree quieting title to the Subject Property in
Gold Mountain subject to easements in Missouri Fiat for grazing and agricultural purposes and
to cut and remove quaking aspen and chaparral.
4. Missouri Fiat seeks a decree declaring that Missouri Flat is the owner of all surface
rights in the Subject Property subject to certain rights of Gold Mountain to use the surface for
mining purposes.
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5. The dispute over the rights to the surface of the Subject Property originate in a
document referred to as an Indenture dated April 26, 1951 and recorded July 20, 1951 at Book
J of Mining, Page 615 of the records of the Piute County Recorder's Office (the "Indenture").
6. Gold Mountain is the successor in interest to the "First Party", the grantor, in the
Indenture.
7. Missouri Flat is the successor in interest to the "Second Parties", the grantees, in
the Indenture.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Court has jurisdiction over this matter.
2. The cross-motions for summary judgment warrant the Court's granting of summary
judgment in this matter.
3. Gold Mountain's claims against Missouri Flat in this matter are not barred by
latches or estoppel.
4. The Indenture is not ambiguous and its meaning can be determined by construction
of the terms of the Indenture.
5. The plain language of the Indenture indicates that the grantor intended to convey
something less than the full rights to the surface. The specific words are, "First Party ... sells
... unto Second Parties, for grazing and agricultural purposes ... ." The limiting phrase
being for grazing and agricultural purposes. The limiting phrase begins with the word "for,"
which means "used as a function word to indicate purpose." Merriam-Webster Online
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Dictionary, hitp; www.m-w.com. The limiting phrase is positioned within 3 words of the
transfer verb "sells."
6. The use of the word "for" was intended to show the purpose for which the surface
could be used. By the same token, it excludes all other such purposes.
7. The grantor reserved something unto itself. Specifically, the grantor reserved unto
itself the right to enter and to occupy. Such a reservation can only be consistent with a grant
of less than the full rights to the surface.
8. The use of the words "to have and to hold..." do not necessarily mean that the
grant is one of fee simple absolute. It appears that that which was granted forever was the
"the above described surface," the rights to which had already been described and limited.
9. It appears that the grant of the building was made in fee simple absolute as to the
surface because it was permanently attached to the land and the grantor must have wanted to
give the grantees the exclusive use and control of it.
10. Based on the above construction of the Indenture, Missouri Flat owns the
following rights and interests in the Subject Property:
a.

The one story frame house located in the Upper Kimberly at the fork of the road
leading to Sevier and Marys vale, Utah and that portion of the surface which it
covers in fee simple absolute;
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b.

A permanent easement to use the rest of the surface for grazing and agricultural
purposes, subject to Gold Mountain's right to enter the surface for mining and
other purposes as set out in the Indenture; and

c.

A permanent right and easement to cut and remove from the surface all of the
quaking aspen and chaparral thereon.

11. Missouri Flat has not established any rights or title in the Subject Property beyond
the rights granted by the Indenture by adverse possession.
12. Based on the above construction of the Indenture, Gold Mountain owns in fee
simple absolute all other rights and interests, including the surface, in and to the Subject
Property subject only to the rights of Missouri Flat in the Subject Property set out in
paragraph 10.
ORDER AND DECREE
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED AND DECREED AS FOLLOWS:
1. The cross-motions for summary judgment by Gold Mountain and Missouri Flat are
granted and denied to the extent that the Court finds that the rights and title to the Subject
Property are owned and held as herein provided.
2. Gold Mountain is the owner in fee simple absolute and is entitled to possession of
and title to all rights and interests, including the surface, in and to the Subject Property as
described in EXHIBIT A attached hereto to and made a part hereof subject only to the rights
of Missouri Flat in the Subject Property set out below.
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3. Missouri Flat is the owner of and is entitled to possession of and title to the
following rights and interests in the Subject Property:
a.

The one story frame house located in the Upper Kimberly at the fork of the road
leading to Sevier and Marysvale, Utah and that portion of the surface which it
covers in fee simple absolute;

b.

A permanent easement to use the rest of the surface for grazing and agricultural
purposes, subject to Gold Mountain's right to enter the surface for mining and
other purposes as set out in the Indenture; and

c.

A permanent right and easement to cut and remove from the surface all of the
quaking aspen and chaparral thereon.

DATED

4dC &

2003
BY THE COURT

LAP^UU
DilfcvieHl Mower
District Court Judge

° ^ ^
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law and Order and Decree was mailed, postage prepaid, on this ffi^day of June, 2003 to the
following:
Ronald G. Russell
PARR WADDOUPS BROWN GEE & LOVELESS
P.O. Box 11019
Salt Lake City, UT 84147-0019
Warrant G. Peterson
Richard Waddingham
WADDINGHAM & PETERSON
362 West Main Street
Delta, UT 84624

2003171.L
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EXHIBIT A
Patented Mining Claims
(Piute County)
CLAIM NAME
FRACTION A
GOLD MOUNTAIN H&J
PIONEER MINE
UTICANO. 1
UTICA NO. 2
W. F. LODE

MINERAL SURVEY NO.
4769 & 4710

BIRD OF ALL BIRDS

4462

BLUE LEDGE
LOOKOUT
NO. 1
NO. 2
MILLER FRACTION
SOUTHERLY EXTENSION OF NO. 2
NO. I FRACTION
EXTENSION OF THE ERIE
UTE
UTE FRACTION
BLISTER
FISH CREEK MILL SITE

4430A & 4430B

DANDY QUILL

3850

SEVIER EXTENSION
ERIE
ERIE FRACTION
POINTER
SEVIER EXTENSION GROUP
SEVIER CONSOLIDATED MILL SITE

4694-A, 4694-B & 4694-C

MAMMOTH
HORSE SHOE
HORSE SHOE FRACTION
PALMER G.
PALMER G. FRACTION

6444

EXHIBIT A, Page I

CLAIM NAME

MINERAL SURVEY NO.

HORSE SHOE FRACTION NO. 2
ORO CHAIN
GEORGE S.
GEORGE S. FRACTION
GOOD ENOUGH
GOOD ENOUGH FRACTION
CAPTAIN DODGE
BASIN MINING CLAIM
MINERAL POINT
CROWN POINT
MINERAL POINT FRACTION
BASIN FRACTION
BRACKENRIDGE NO. 2
MASCOT FRACTION
STATEHOOD
DODGE FRACTION
FORT DODGE

6444 (continued)

RED BIRD
BLUEBIRD
BLUE BIRD FRACTION
FRANK JAY
GRASSHOPPER
LAST CHANCE

3488

OUTZEN FRACTION

4965

BUNKERHELL
DUNMORE
FREE PRESS
FOURTH OF JULY

4421

TOM BOY
EDITH

4939

DEER PARK

4457

D.J.
SENATOR CANNON

4415

LINCOLN

4419
EXHIBIT A, Page 2
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CLAIM NAME

MINERAL SURVEY NO.

GARFIELD

4419 (continued)

SEVIER
GULCH
AD ALINE
SEVIER MILLSITE

37

ROLLING HELLS NO. 2
ROLLING HELLS
WEBER
MAED OF THE MIST NO. 2
MAED OF THE MIST NO. 4
HILLSIDE NO. 3
HILLSIDE NO. 4
JESSIE NO. 6
STANLEY
MAID OF THE MIST NO. 3
HILLSIDE NO. 2
HILLSIDE
JESSIE NO. 1
JESSIE NO. 2
JESSIE NO. 3
JESSIE NO. 4
JESSIE NO. 5
MAED OF THE MIST

4401 & 4416

ROLLING HELLS NO. 3
ROLLING HELLS NO. 4
GOLD BERD NO. 2
ROLLING HELLS NO. 5
ROLLING HELLS NO. 6

4453

WEBER NO. 2
WEBER NO. 3
PREDE OF AMERICA NO. 2
PRJDE OF AMERICA NO. 3
MAED OF THE MIST NO. 5
MAED OF THE MIST NO. 6
HILLSIDE NO. 5
HILLSIDE NO. 6
HILLSIDE NO. 7

4442

EXHIBIT A, Page 3
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CLAIM NAME

MINERAL SURVEY NO.

HILLSIDE NO.:
JESSIE NO. 7
JESSIE NO. 8
JESSIE NO. 9
JESSIE NO. 10

4442 (continued)

GOLD BIRD NO. 3
GOLD BIRD NO. 4
GOLD BIRD NO. 5
GOLD BIRD NO. 6
GOLD BIRD NO. 7
GOLD BIRD NO. 8
GOLD BIRD NO. 9
GOLD BIRD NO. 10
GOLD BIRD NO. 11
GOLD BIRD NO. 12
GOLD BIRD NO. 13
GOLD BIRD NO. 14
GOLD BIRD NO. 15
GOLD BIRD NO. 16
GOLD BIRD NO. 17
GOLD BIRD NO. 18

4455

HOLLAND
PLACER GULCH

3334

GOLD CITY

3851

JAMES G. BLAINE
MORTON
SURPRISE
LOOKOUT
OUTZEN

4301

SNOW GIRL
M. J. & S.
MOGUL
HAZEL KIRK

4291

ANNIE LAURIE
SENATOR STEWART

3207

EXHIBIT A, Page 4

CLAIM NAME

MINERAL SURVEY NO.

LILLIAN
CHIEF DEVORA
ROYAL GORGE
NATIONAL
H. S. & S.
OVERLAND
MINNIE MAUD

3207 (continued)

OVERLAND FRACTION

4586

ANNIE MINE
GENEVA
FENNY
SWITZERLAND

5297

COLUMBIA
YUKON
U. S. TREASURY
BRITANNIA
KLONDIKE
BANK OF ENGLAND

5170

Other Property
(Piute County)
Township 26 South. Range 5 West. SLB&M
Section 36: Lots 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5, NW1/4SW1/4, SV2W/2
(Sevier County)
Township 26 South. Range 5 West. SLB&M
Section 36: W/2W/2

2003184
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Certificate of Service
I, Valeen H. Brown Piute County Clerk certify that a true and correct copy of the
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order and Decree was mailed, postage prepaid,
on this 7th day of November, 2003 to the following:
Ronald G. Russell
Parr Waddoups Brown Gee and Loveless
P O Box 11019
Salt Lake City, Utah 84747-0019
Warren H Peterson
362 West Main Street
Delta Utah 84624
Richard G. Allen
2975 West Executive Parkway Suite 200
Lehi, Utah 84043

Signed this

/

day of November 2003.

l/^vi-. i

Valeen H. Brown, Piute County Clerk

